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Abstract: 
 
Actions expressing strong emotions such as anger can be appropriate responses when an agent 
judges a serious injustice to have been committed. Certainly, a woman can experience these 
conditions and express herself through actions such as gesturing aggressively, gritting her teeth, 
or lashing out verbally. If she is consequently labeled “crazy,” “hysterical,” or “a bitch,” what 
has gone awry? This paper offers an analysis of the common charge of inappropriateness in the 
case of women’s actions expressing emotion. To begin, I present core normative distinctions that 
define appropriate emotional expression. Following this, the “double-bind” of women’s actions 
expressing emotion will be explored with reference to the conflicting normative practices 
outlined in the first section of the paper. Put briefly, when a female agent surpasses gendered 
behavioral expectations, she is seen as having failed what can be called the first test of social 
coping. The perception of this failure shuts down further avenues for interpreting her behavior. 
Instead, the social inappropriateness of her emotion is used as further proof of irrationality. The 
arguments of the second section leave no doubt that gendered norms in the case of actions 
expressing emotions must be rejected both on epistemological and moral grounds. The final 
section of the paper explores epistemically and ethically viable alternatives for deciding the 
rational appropriateness of actions expressing emotion. 
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Judging Inappropriateness  
in Actions Expressing Emotion: 
A Feminist Perspective 
FRANCES BOTTENBERG 
 
In the 1949 film Adam’s Rib, Amanda Bonner (Katharine 
Hepburn) begins to cry during a quarrel with her husband Adam (Spencer 
Tracy). Mr. Bonner, in a tone that bespeaks exasperation, says: “Here we 
go again, the old juice. Guaranteed heartbreaker. A few female tears. 
Stronger than any acid. But this time it won’t work.” 
Mrs. Bonner’s crying is ineffectual because, in her husband’s eyes 
at least, it is an emotional behaviour that is excessive to the matter at hand, 
i.e. the argument. But why does he mark this behaviour as excessive? Is 
the fact that her husband perceives the tears as ineffectual sufficient to 
discredit them? If we know (as we do by that time in the film) that Mrs. 
Bonner has used her actions expressing emotion (such as crying) in the 
past to deflect attention from the matter at hand (using her tears as a red 
herring)—we are more likely to side with her husband’s assessment. 
However, even if we know of Mrs. Bonner’s past behaviours, a troubling 
question persists: what if her tears are genuinely produced this time, and 
Mr. Bonner’s words amount to an unfair attack on his partner? If this is 
the case, then his words ought be turned against him, since they speak to a 
moral insensitivity on his part rather than to an excessiveness on hers. In 
fact, if this is the case, then his words reveal not just an insensitivity 
towards her, a particular woman who is crying, but to all women: the 
generalizing sentiment of his “A few female tears” and “Here we go again, 
the old juice” presents a picture of women’s crying behaviours as general 
annoyances and hindrances to rational discourse. Enter masculinist bias. 
These interpretations of the Bonner quarrel scene hint at the 
epistemic and moral complexities involved in applying the concepts of 
excessiveness and irrationality particularly to women’s actions expressing 
emotion. Broadly, the concepts of excessiveness and irrationality mark 
violations of normative appropriateness. The trouble with public displays 
of emotion, however, lies in determining what factors are involved in such 
assessment. Further, there is the matter of how the degree of an infraction 
is determined. Naively or in an informed way, we invariably rely on 
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heuristics to decide whether to classify one offense as mild and easy to 
look past and another as so severe as to be deemed pathological. 
This paper analyzes the common charge of inappropriateness in the 
case of women’s actions expressing emotion. I structure this analysis into 
three sections. First, core normative distinctions that generally define 
appropriate emotional expression will be presented. Then, looking at the 
case of women diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder, I will 
explore the double-bind which women are in when it comes to expressing 
emotion publicly. Nancy Potter articulates this double-bind as follows: “If 
[women] are vehement in their expressions of anger, they may be viewed 
as pathologically angry. If they are already viewed as ‘too angry’, then 
their denying that they are angry is proof of regression” (61). Supported 
by arguments for the conscious rejection of gendered norms in the case of 
actions expressing emotions, the third and final section of the paper 
explores epistemically and ethically viable alternatives for deciding the 
rational appropriateness of actions expressing emotion.  
 
I 
Norms defining and constraining behaviour being plentiful, I wish 
to focus on those which come into play when actions expressing emotion 
are interpersonally assessed. First, I propose two overarching rational 
modes into which norms used in the identification of (in)appropriate 
emotion-sourced action fall. In outlining these modes, I build on Patricia 
Greenspan’s work on the rationality of emotion, and in particular her 
distinction of evidential and instrumental rationality (her terms). The 
norms of evidential rationality are epistemic in nature; they have to do 
with someone’s getting the facts right and drawing strong inferences from 
them. For example, the person who acts delighted upon learning she has 
been awarded a coveted hire is an example of emotion-expressive action 
that coheres with epistemic norms—landing a job one hoped for is a 
reason for contentment and celebration. To express delight on such an 
occasion is thus epistemically appropriate and evidentially rational. 
Alternatively, the partner who acts out his jealousy despite having no 
evidence in support of his belief of being cheated on, and plenty of 
evidence to the contrary, is an example of emotion-expressive action that 
violates epistemic norms and as a result is epistemically inappropriate and 
thus evidentially irrational.  
I would add to Greenspan’s discussion a second key group of 
norms that govern evidential rationality: those which adjudicate the 
appropriateness of value attributions and the drawing of inferences based 
on these attributions. Evaluative norms must be at least partially distinct of 
epistemic norms, since it is easy to imagine a case where a person has the 
facts right but still acts in a way that is judged evidentially inappropriate. 
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For example, consider what Sandel terms “hyper-parenting,” the modern-
day fad of the aggressive promotion of one’s own children at lengths that 
seem inappropriate to everyone except the parents. There is the perennial 
local media coverage, for instance, of a parent becoming enraged and even 
physically assaulting a referee at his child’s sports game. Investigation of 
such a case and others like it will reveal that the agent has under- or 
overvalued the salience of a given fact within his or her reasoning—in the 
case of the hyperparent, anything that criticizes the child is deemed a 
violation. Because our emotional life is intrinsically bound to our valuings, 
if someone has an out-of-touch set of value priorities, this will come to 
light through his or her emotion-sourced qua valuing-sourced behaviour.  
So on the one hand, we have: 
Norms of evidential rationality 
i. Epistemic norms 
ii. Evaluative norms  
Actions expressing emotions ought first be appraised in terms of 
their apparent (in)coherence with these norms of evidential rationality. On 
the other hand, there is the vast territory of social mores, interpersonal 
communication, and first-person coping. These represent facets of 
instrumental rationality, Greenspan’s second rational mode, which 
concerns the role of behaviour in determining an interpersonal or 
intrapersonal effect. An intended intrapersonal effect falls under what I 
term self-relevant coping, while interpersonal effects are tokens of social 
coping. It is certainly possible to imagine one behaviour being a case of 
both self-relevant coping and social coping. For that reason, and for the 
sake of visual simplicity, I list self-relevant coping alongside six other 
normative subdivisions within social coping. Each bears brief introduction 
and illustration: 
Norms of instrumental rationality 
Group 1. 
i. Agency norms have to do with the apparent voluntariness or 
involuntariness of action—a “first test” which must be passed for 
further judgments of appropriateness to be levelled against the 
agent. Persons with certain cognitive disabilities, sleepwalkers, and 
intoxicated individuals fall outside this parameter, because they are 
held less strategically accountable for their actions, due to the 
relative lack of control over them. 
ii. Practice-specific norms cover the boundless number of 
practices, professions, rituals, group habits, games, ceremonies, 
memes, etc. which abound in human society. A funeral calls for 
very different emotional behaviour than a wedding does, a poker 
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player must radically change her expressive bearing to play at 
charades, and an “academic” stance during a meeting with friends 
may leave an impression of aloofness. 
iii. Self-relevant coping norms include behaviours such as avoiding 
assault, venting stress, and overcoming trauma. The 
appropriateness of emotional behaviour associated with these 
actions is difficult to assess by an outsider, since they are elicited 
by the one coping him- or herself, in reaction to a prior stressful, 
traumatic or unpleasant event, rather than the occurrent 
interpersonal context.  
Group 2.  
iv. Developmental norms define how age groups are expected to 
behave. A precocious child is often perceived to be strangely adult, 
and greedy, power-hungry adults are unflatteringly likened to 
children. The cases of cognitive disability and some forms of 
physical impairment problematize these norms, yet they remain 
pervasive and deep-seated.  
v. Class norms come into play with socio-economic status. The 
nouveau riche, for instance, were given their name precisely to 
mark their behaviours and mannerisms as different from “old 
money.” Or take the Dickensonian picture of the moral characters 
of rich and poor, in which the poor are expected to be obsequious, 
pious, and humble, in contrast to the ultra-rich who are expected to 
be bossy, demanding, and callous.   
vi. Cultural norms catch those standards that we apply to each 
other as members of a particular country and region of the world.  
Many a joke has been made at the expense of the stiff, laconic 
Swede and the effusive, buoyant Sicilian. 
vii. Gender norms capture those behavioural norms that are applied 
differently depending on the agent’s gender. For instance, while 
both men and women can be called “aggressive” or “assertive”, 
when applied to women these terms are usually meant derisively. 
They are often complimentary for a man.  
Much could be said of these normative categories. Most of all, I 
would like to remark on the sense of keeping Group 1 and Group 2 
conceptually distinct. The normative subsets of Group 1 seem neutral in a 
fundamental way to the politics of identity and social customs of group 
identification. In other words, Group 1 categories require attending to the 
particularities of the agent and/or her practical context. The subsets of 
Group 2, however, fall squarely into that arena. The subsets of Group 2 
produce pervasive forms of social stereotyping. The epistemic, moral, and 
political problem with stereotypes is that they are “extrapersonal”; they 
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stand outside of and do not assess an individual’s well-being, current state 
of mind, personality, capabilities, or interests. They should as a result be 
regarded as the least rationally satisfying of social coping infringements 
because they are substantially based on arational public custom. 
Unfortunately, assessing others using stereotypes remains satisfying to 
many people, possibly because of their arationality: stereotypes are 
descriptively superficial, resistant to reflective amendment, yet very 
powerful.  
While Marxists aim to overthrow class stereotyping, disability 
activists engage developmental stereotypes, ethnographers and post-
colonialists dismantle cultural stereotypes, it is left to feminists, gender 
and queer theorists to address and attempt to uproot gender stereotypes. 
Having introduced a way to classify core norms called on in assessing the 
(in)appropriateness of actions expressing emotion, I wish now to make a 
modest contribution to this third project.  
 
II 
To begin, it must be stated that gender stereotyping is, in our 
society at least, misogynistic. Women’s opportunities for expression and 
action, not heterosexual men’s, tend more often to be foreshortened 
because of gender stereotypes. It is true that men are called “wimps” or 
“saps” (usually by other men) more readily than women are when they 
express sadness or self-pity. Yet, women expressing strong, self-assertive 
emotion are standardly assessed by both men and other women as acting 
inappropriately. Women are socially expected to avoid behaviours such as 
acting assertively, demanding things loudly, showing fierce, self-interested 
emotion. Particularly compelling support for this is gleaned from Susan 
Brison’s account of the empowering effect of women’s self-defense 
courses on victims of sexual assault; women are often surprised at how 
difficult the simple act of yelling “No!” can prove to be (14). 
As treated by classic and recent feminist texts, there is a story 
concerning “women’s nature” that has held and still holds traction in 
Western patriarchal societies: the idea that women are perennially at risk 
of “losing their heads” and acting out their emotions, to their own shame. 
The misogynistic suppositions of that story go something like this: while 
man is the rational sex, his virtue and self-transcendence lying in logic-
dictated thought and action, “woman is Other”, as de Beauvoir classically 
put it: sensuous, sensitive, and sentimental. Hers is the sex most “in tune” 
with the human senses and bodily nature, and, whether as a result of this 
or not, her sometimes only dimly conscious emotions, rather than her fully 
conscious appreciation of reasons, are her chief guides in thought and 
action. Self-transcendence is much harder for her to achieve because of 
this, and woman’s truest virtue lies in a mild and gentle emotional life, and 
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in a graceful, non-assertive bodily language (see Young). Vehement, even 
violently intrusive public displays of emotional upheaval and turmoil are 
as a consequence best interpreted as signs of her ill health, of her 
derangement or hysteria (Bordo 311, 316). 
We are all familiar with this story, which is in reality the 
entrapment of women, an a priori curtailing of their possibilities for action 
and voice. Even today there are plenty of men and women who find 
recourse to its suppositions justified. A particularly illuminating case is 
worth looking at in more depth. This is the case, treated thoughtfully by 
Nancy Potter in a recent chapter contribution (Problem), of anger 
expression in women diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder 
(BPD). 
As Larry May points out, violent, self-interested emotions such as 
anger are so commonly expressed in adolescent and adult males that “we 
all come to expect it” (8). It is not expected, however, that women, and 
especially young women, get angry and lash out in their anger. 
Nonetheless, it is taken for granted that anger can be an appropriate 
response, given certain conditions. Aristotle’s analysis of rationally 
appropriate anger has yet to be surpassed: “Let anger be [defined as] 
desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] distress, for conspicuous 
retaliation because of a conspicuous slight that was directed, without 
justification, against oneself or those near to one” (Rhetoric 2.2.1 
1378a 30-32; G. A. Kennedy translation). Certainly, a woman can 
experience these conditions and express herself through anger. If she is 
consequently labeled “crazy” or “hysterical”, what has gone awry? 
Marilyn Frye argues that women’s anger at perceived moral injustice 
against their person is peremptorily trivialized, rather than taken seriously; 
mocked, rather than treated with respect; pathologized, rather than taken 
as rational (89). “When it comes to women’s claims of injustices and 
injuries,” Potter writes, “women are told to stop ‘playing the victim,’ to 
stop blaming others for their plight, and to take responsibility for their 
lives” (61).  
75 % of patients diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder 
are female (Potter 60). BPD, as described by the Mayo Clinic, is 
… an emotional disorder that causes emotional instability, leading 
to stress and other problems. With [BPD] your image of yourself is 
distorted, making you feel worthless and fundamentally flawed. 
Your anger, impulsivity and frequent mood swings may push 
others away, even though you desire loving relationships.  
Not surprisingly, as Marsha Linehan has shown, gender norms 
come into play in assessing individuals for BPD diagnosis: “behaviour that 
is labeled ‘assertive’ in men may be labeled ‘aggressive’ in women,” she 
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writes. “Perceived aggression begets retaliatory aggression, and thus the 
cycle of interpersonal conflict is born” (71). But the twist is still to come: 
many experts now see the “anger issues” of female BPD patients in terms 
of their inability to cope with strong emotions, rather than a desire and 
ability to express themselves through strong emotion. Female BPD 
patients tend to be “angerphobic,” and their so-called telltale outbursts of 
anger are in fact akin to the allergic expulsion of a foreign body. “It is a 
recognized social phenomenon that girls and women are not taught that it 
is sometimes appropriate to be angry or what appropriate expressions of it 
look like,” Potter explains. “Some are unable even to identify what anger 
feels like” (61). This new information changes the diagnostic picture 
radically. Therapists and clinicians tended to treat the expression of strong 
emotion in their female BPD patients as a matter of character, and in so 
doing, they became insensitive to the possibility that their patients could in 
fact be reacting rationally—acting reasonably angry—to real-time 
provocations (Potter 61-62). Potter offers striking anecdotal evidence to 
support this conclusion. 
The case of misdiagnosis gets to the heart of the problem of 
interpersonal assessments of women’s actions expressing emotions. 
Women’s actions expressing especially aggressively self-assertive 
emotion are all too often judged inappropriate because they violate a 
viciously circular stereotype. In the moment of angry outburst, a female 
agent fails the first test of social (instrumental) appropriateness, due to her 
surpassing behavioural expectations. This failure in turn often shuts down 
further avenues of interpretation. Most significantly, whether a woman’s 
emotional expression is evidentially rational becomes a secondary and 
non-obligatory question. In the case of at least some female BPD patients, 
this shutting down process has been internalized by the female agent 
herself, when she labels her own actions expressing emotion as 
inappropriate and irrational. 
In the case of men, by contrast, since there is little behavioural 
restriction normatively imposed on their actions expressing aggressively 
self-assertive emotion (indeed, there is a pervasive norm that a man should 
stand up for himself, defend his honour, etc.), it is unlikely that they will 
fail the test of social appropriateness in their anger. And, further, men’s 
actions are usually granted evidential warrantedness as if by default. 
Should a man perform an emotion in a way deemed socially inappropriate, 
it is likely that the observer will even then grant him charity and seek out 
his reasons for acting thusly. Hence, when men fail the social coping test, 
they are expected to give verbal evidence for their evidential rationality, 
and in this way justify the extreme action. A woman who fails the social 
coping test may not be offered this chance, the inappropriateness of her 
emotion instead being used as further proof of female irrationality. 
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Potter thus rightly notes that women are in a double bind when it 
comes to actions expressing emotion, especially strong emotions such as 
anger. Where I differ with Potter and others is on the diagnosis of the 
precise source of this bind. In my view, it is not enough to say that 
women’s anger, for instance, will not be perceived as reasonable because 
women are considered irrational. First of all, this is simply not true: 
women have never been considered inherently, permanently irrational. 
Rather, the historical masculinist picture has it that women are imperfectly 
rational beings. Men, too, are imperfectly rational beings, but rank higher 
on the scale.  
As a diagnosis, secondly, this line of reasoning is too vague. My 
claim is that the adherence to social norms that limit women’s emotional 
and behavioural repertoires is at the root of attributions of the irrationality 
of their actions expressing emotion. These social norms effectively cut off 
any significant consideration of a woman’s evidential rationality and self-
relevant coping in a given context. Put in other words, no matter how a 
woman acts and on what epistemic and evaluative foundation she does so, 
assuming gendered coping norms are in place, her rational agency is likely 
to be undermined or at least doubted through the use of biased assessments 
that hinder and displace other means of normative assessment.  
 
III 
Having begun to identify the normative prioritization at play in the 
case of assessing women’s actions expressing emotion, I can say that my 
account is in one sense an optimistic one, since it locates a core source of 
misogyny in behavioural norms and expectations, rather than ontological 
difference or gender essences. What remains to be stated are which norms 
one ought to prioritize in assessing another’s actions expressing emotion. 
What norms ought serve as gate-keepers for sorting such actions into 
acceptable and unacceptable, healthy and unhealthy? That gender 
stereotypes ought be rejected is only the first (and to be expected) 
conclusion of this project. This final section will suggest other preliminary 
conclusions, framed within responses to two objections I can imagine 
being levelled against my optimistic argument. 
Objection 1. What if the standards of rationality are gendered?  
Genevieve Lloyd, in her classic analysis The Man of Reason, 
argues that “Our trust in Reason that knows no sex has … been largely 
self-deceiving” (xix). If this is the case, then my sourcing of gender bias to 
social norms of instrumental rationality is specious—the bias being far 
more deep-rooted in the very nature of thinking. However, I am not eager 
to draw such a radical conclusion, even while I find Lloyd’s description of 
the historical masculinization of rationality entirely plausible.  
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To be brief, it does not follow from the historical laying claim to 
reason of one gender (and class and ethnicity) that the capacity itself is 
originally in service to the self-image of that purported owner. Reason as a 
“faculty” was certainly appropriated by male culture. And “emotionality” 
was imposed, and also frequently embraced, by women. Both of these 
attributions proved disempowering for women, as Sandra Bartky notes 
(102). Still, the capacity to reason itself—and to learn to reason well—
amounts to nothing political or sinister on its own, in my view, but only 
the learning and rehearsing of a set of cognitive skills. As a result of male 
appropriation, reasoning may have taken on sinister metaphorical 
connotations. But no metaphor can displace its foundation, which in this 
case is an original, gender-neutral cognitive capacity. In the first chapter 
of Maternal Thinking, Sara Ruddick articulates her difficult relationship to 
Reason and her enduring commitment to reasoning, and in so doing offers 
us a way out of the dilemma: 
Yet however rebellious I felt, I did not doubt, and I do not now, 
that as destructive as Western ideals of Reason may be, the 
capacity to reason is a human good. I know what a pleasure it is to 
learn, experiment, imagine, discover, design, and invent. There is 
real strength in steady judgment, self-reflectiveness, clear speech, 
and attentive listening. … I have never been persuaded that there is 
anything precious, or specifically bourgeois, or merely Western, or 
exclusively masculine about the human needs and pleasures of 
reason. (8-9) 
Ruddick’s question is not: how can we rid ourselves of Reason, but how 
can we “honour Reason” differently, which is the question I also wish to 
ask.  
Objection 2. Is gender entirely irrelevant to assessing another’s action 
expressing emotion?  
My initial impulse is to respond vaguely: Gender is not any more 
or less important than any other features which form a person’s particular 
identity. However, this non-committal response short-changes a deeper 
conviction, which is that gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, profession, and 
cognitive development are not genuinely salient to the scenario under 
examination in this paper, namely that of giving space for and recognizing 
the intelligence in (if perhaps also the problematic or even faulty 
reasoning underlying) another’s emotional life. Grasping the worth behind 
another’s emotions may indeed require awareness of the agent’s own 
sense of belonging to some or all of these socio-political classifications. 
What is ultimately at stake, as Potter rightly notes, is the expressive 
individual’s real-time sense of herself as a competent (rational) agent (63). 
In so doing, the observer’s own sense of the agent’s “really” belonging to 
these classifications (and respective stereotypes) should be left out of the 
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equation, as difficult as it may be to do. Stereotyping on the part of the 
observer blocks perceiving the agent in her intelligent reaching out 
through emotional expression.  
Having exposed gender prejudice within typical assessments of 
others’ actions expressing emotion, it is true that we are left with fewer 
“quick and dirty” means by which to judge their appropriateness. How 
shall we fill that gap? The answer that suggests itself requires replacing 
stereotypes with relational norms. A sense of one’s investment in and 
relation to the expressions of another is basic to the faithful and charitable 
appraisal of their actions expressing emotion. Further, since empathic 
listening helps legitimate an agent’s emotional expressions and narrative 
imagining helps make them intelligible, empathy and narrative 
imagination are both excellent candidates for developing a keener sense of 
relationality. Their training should be encouraged at all levels of education 
and socialization. 
It is true that our emotional lives are fundamentally concerned with 
what we ourselves care about within our own sphere of action and 
influence, what we are concerned to preserve and nurture, what we eschew 
and eliminate or ignore. When our concerns, values and access to 
information align with those of another, his or her actions expressing 
emotion will speak to us far more readily than in cases when our concerns 
and our access don’t overlap. It is in these latter cases, though, when we 
are met with our own incomprehension of another’s emotional expression, 
that we ought to be most prepared to engage our capacity for empathy and 
imagination. 
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